Minimally sufficient conditions for the evolution of social learning and the emergence of non-genetic evolutionary systems by Gonzalez, Miguel et al.
                          Gonzalez, M., Watson, R., & Bullock, S. (2017). Minimally sufficient
conditions for the evolution of social learning and the emergence of non-
genetic evolutionary systems. Artificial Life, 23(4), 493-517.
https://doi.org/10.1162/ARTL_a_00244
Peer reviewed version
Link to published version (if available):
10.1162/ARTL_a_00244
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via MIT Press at https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/full/10.1162/ARTL_a_00244 . Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
Gonzalez et al. • 2017
Minimally su cient conditions for the evolution of social
learning and the emergence of non-genetic evolutionary
systems
Miguel Gonzalez⇤,⇤⇤, Richard Watson⇤⇤ and Seth Bullock⇤⇤⇤
⇤Contact author. ⇤⇤Institute for Complex Systems Simulations, University of Southampton, UK SO17 1BJ
⇤⇤⇤Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, UK, BS8 1UB
E-mail: mgc1g11@soton.ac.uk (M.G.), r.a.watson@soton.ac.uk (R.W.), seth.bullock@bristol.ac.uk (S.B.)
Abstract
Social learning, defined as the imitation of behaviours performed by others, is recognised
as a distinctive characteristic in humans and several other animal species. Previous work has
claimed that the evolutionary fixation of social learning requires decision-making cognitive
abilities that result in transmission bias (e.g., discriminatory imitation) and/or guided varia-
tion (e.g., adaptive modification of behaviours through individual learning). Here, we present
and analyse a simple agent-based model which demonstrates that the transition from instinc-
tive actuators (i.e., non-learning agents whose behaviour is hardcoded in their genes) to social
learners (i.e., agents that imitate behaviours) can occur without invoking such decision-making
abilities. The model shows that the social learning of a trait may evolve and fix in a pop-
ulation if there are many possible behavioural variants of the trait, if it is subject to strong
selection pressure for survival (as distinct from reproduction), and if imitation errors occur at
a higher rate than genetic mutation. These results demonstrate that the (sometimes implicit)
assumption in prior work that decision-making abilities are required is incorrect, thus allowing
a more parsimonious explanation for the evolution of social learning that applies to a wider
range of organisms. Furthermore, we identify genotype-phenotype disengagement as a signal
for the imminent fixation of social learners, and explain the way in which this disengagement
leads to the emergence of a basic form of cultural evolution (i.e., a non-genetic evolutionary
system).
Keywords: non-genetic evolution, animal culture, evolution of social learning, horizontal
information transfer, imitation, survival selection.
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1 The evolution of social learning
The evolution of social learning (i.e., the ability to acquire and replicate behavioural information
expressed by others) has been identified as a pre-requisite for the emergence of culture [38, 31]. Re-
search on the evolution of social learning generally investigates conditions where (1) social learners
invade a population of individual learners (i.e., agents that can learn fit strategies at the expense
of a fitness cost associated with trial-and-error learning), and (2) social learners increase the aver-
age fitness of a population [39, 15, 1, 5, 29]. In contrast, few models have investigated conditions
where social learners can invade a monomorphic population of instinctive actuators (i.e., individ-
uals whose behaviour is hardcoded in genes) [11, 6]. The rarity of these types of models reflects
the consensus view that all forms of social learning in nature must have emerged in species where
individual learning already existed [31, 38, 20]. In cases where instinctive actuators compete with
social learners and individual learners, a mixed population of these learning strategies has no dif-
ficulty invading and entirely displacing instinctive actuators [1, 5, 6]. Furthermore, social learners
alone are considered to be capable of displacing instinctive actuators as long as they have certain
decision-making abilities [38, 15]. These abilities are grouped into two categories (1) transmission
biases, where social learners bias their imitation towards certain (fitter) behaviours, and (2) guided
variation, where imitated behaviours can be adaptively improved through a facultative form of
individual learning [38].
Decision-making abilities allow social learners to accelerate the pace of cultural evolution far
beyond that of relatively slow genetic evolution [32, 3]. With these abilities social learners can
iterate, discriminate and selectively retain behaviours throughout a single lifetime, whereas these
processes would require several generations of genetic evolution [38, 32]. However, it has been
argued that if decision-making abilities and/or individual learners are not present, social learners
are unable to invade and fixate in a population of instinctive actuators [11]. In 1983, Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman showed that any degree of horizontal (or oblique) imitation in social learners
(i.e., imitating non-parental behaviours) translates into a fitness cost when compared to instinctive
actuators and therefore concluded that unbiased (indiscriminate) imitation could not enable social
learners to invade a population of instinctive actuators.
In this paper we challenge two fundamental ideas underlying prior work; (1) social learners
require decision-making abilities (i.e., transmission bias and/or guided variation) in order to fix
in a population of instinctive actuators [39, 15, 1, 5, 29, 38] and (2) unbiased social learners (i.e.,
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indiscriminate social learners without decision-making abilities) can only invade a population of
instinctive actuators if individual learners are also present [38, 11, 39, 1, 5]. In contrast to prior
work, we investigate scenarios where: (1) the relative importance of selection for reproduction and
selection for survival can be varied (also referred to as fecundity selection and viability selection,
respectively), and (2) an extended strategy space can potentially be explored by either a genetic evo-
lutionary system (in the form of instinctive actuators expressing genetically hard-wired behaviours
that are subject to mutation) or a non-genetic evolutionary system (in the form of social learners
expressing imitated behaviours that are subject to imitation error). Using simulation modelling,
we show that when selection for survival (viability) is stronger than selection for reproduction
(fecundity), and imitation error rates are higher than genetic mutation rates, social learners can
irreversibly fix in a population of instinctive actuators. Furthermore, we identify a process termed
genotype-phenotype disengagement that acts as a signal for the imminent fixation of social learners,
and explain the way in which such a process leads to the emergence of a non-genetic evolutionary
system.
Our work is framed as a theoretical demonstration that (1) the prior existence of individual
learners is not required to explain the fixation of social learners (i.e., unbiased social learners can
be systematically favoured by selection under the conditions we identify), and (2) decision-making
abilities are likewise not necessary for social learners to invade a population of instinctive actuators.
The evolution of social learning in our model is explained by the relatively advanced exploration
and exploitation capabilities of the invading non-genetic evolutionary system compared to those
of the wild-type genetic system. Our model o↵ers insight into the evolution of social learning
and the emergence of non-genetic evolutionary systems in cases where individual learning is either
prohibitively costly or where the behaviour to be learned is too complex for one individual to achieve.
As discussed in the final section of this paper, our model can also be generalised to other examples
of horizontal information transfer (i.e., other than social learning) and hence explain the emergence
of alternative evolutionary systems (i.e., other than cultural evolution), for example; the evolution
of behaviours that promote horizontal infection -over vertical infection- by symbiotic bacteria (e.g.,
through faecal matter consumption or close-range physical contact) and the consequent emergence
of an evolutionary system which defines key traits of the host population but which information
resides in the bacterial population.
Below we briefly discuss the relationship of social learning to culture before summarising prior
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work on the two main ideas that are challenged in this paper and the assumptions that they depend
on. In order to discuss these ideas we employ the concept of a behavioural variant (i.e., a specific
behaviour obtained by social learning) [38]. Di↵erent behavioural variants may achieve di↵erent
degrees of success at solving a challenge (ultimately translated into fitness scores). In this work we
assume that the particular behavioural variant adopted by a social learner overrides its genetically
encoded instinctive behaviour, and that di↵erent behavioural variants can be understood to be
competing with each other for memory space in the nervous systems of social learners [38, 13].
1.1 Culture as a sophisticated non-genetic evolutionary system
Culture is a di cult concept to grasp, yet it is easy to recognise its importance to our species.
We owe to it our extensive geographic distribution, and our capacity for environmental adaptation,
innovation and civilisation, all of which have increased in magnitude and e ciency over a time
period that is short enough to exclude genetic evolution as an explanation [8, 38]. The specific
processes that gave rise to culture are still unclear, but logically the ability to imitate behaviours
(i.e., social learning) must have evolved genetically before culture emerged [38].
Attempts to define culture are abundant in the literature [24, 19, 37, 39, 38]. Although many of
these definitions encompass processes that we do not consider or include in our model, some view
culture as a simple non-genetic evolutionary system maintained by social learning. More specifically,
the theory of cultural evolution developed by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson defines culture as
a set of behavioural traits that are not the direct result of genetic expression but the product of
an evolving pool of variants stored and imperfectly transmitted within and/or between overlapping
generations by means of social learning [18, 2, 38].
To avoid confusion with other definitions of culture and frame our claims within the limitations
of our simulation model we will use the generic term non-genetic evolutionary system to refer to
all forms of evolutionary systems that emerge as a consequence of non-genetic information transfer
between individuals. In nature, the existence of non-genetic evolutionary systems driven by social
learning have been identified in many species [27, 26, 2]. Evidence of these systems is found in
birds, where song learning occurs by means of imitation [21, 17]; chimpanzees, with well-known
cases of tool use and material culture [30]; Cetaceans, imitating cooperative hunting practices and
mating calls [36]; and others [25].
Human culture is a sophisticated example of a non-genetic evolutionary system [38]. The dis-
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tinctions between human and animal non-genetic evolutionary systems are outside the scope of the
current paper, but some schools of thought object to classifying non-human, socially learned animal
behaviours as examples of culture [25]. There is little contention, however, that all these instances
share a general mechanism during their emergence, most certainly involving some form of social
learning [38, 31, 25].
1.2 Can unbiased social learners invade populations of instinctive actu-
ators?
Previous models describing evolutionary dynamics in populations of social learners and instinctive
actuators have concluded that social learners performing any degree of unbiased horizontal imitation
(i.e., imitation of behaviours from non-parental individuals chosen at random in a well mixed
population) could not invade and fix in a population of instinctive actuators [11, 38]. The dynamical
system model proposed by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman reaches this conclusion with a population
that has two types of strategies, imitators and instinctive actuators; and two possible behaviours,
one behaviour being fitter than the other. Their model keeps track of three types of individuals;
fit imitators (imitators that happen to copy a fit behaviour from the population), unfit imitators
(imitators that happen to copy the unfit behaviour) and fit instinctive actuators (performing the
fit behaviour which they inherited genetically). Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman prove that given these
three types, populations would always converge to the fixation of instinctive actuators [11].
The results of the Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman model can be explained by considering the e↵ect of
unbiased horizontal imitation (referred to as “oblique” transmission in Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
(1983) generational model; where social learners imitate non-parental members of the previous
generation). In their model, the strategy of an instinctive actuator (“be instinctive”) and its
behaviour (“be fit” or “be unfit”) are both transmitted vertically (from its parents). The strategy
of an imitator (“imitate”) is transmitted vertically, but its behaviour (“be fit” or “be unfit”) is
transmitted largely horizontally, since an imitator will pick a random member of the population as
a model. When strategies are evaluated in terms of their reproductive fitness, horizontal imitation
su↵ers a penalty due to the reduced heritability of imitated behaviours. Since the o↵spring of
an imitator will imitate any agent’s behaviour at random, the heritability of an imitator parents
behaviour is broken whenever their o↵spring imitates horizontally rather than vertically. As such,
in a population that exhibits any unfit behaviour at all, a lineage of fit instinctive actuators will
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outperform a lineage of imitators, since whereas the o↵spring of the instinctive actuators tend to
inherit their parents’ fitter than average behaviour, the o↵spring of an imitator is, behaviourally,
anyone’s o↵spring, and hence tends to have average fitness.
Consequently, the claim is that social learners require something more than unbiased imitation
in order to fix in a population of instinctive actuators; they require another source of selection.
To solve this issue several theoretical models have been developed, including examples with trans-
mission biases and guided variation [15, 31, 1, 5], spatial structure (i.e., where agents interact in
an explicit space) [9], and population structure [35]. In this work, models in which social learners
can discern between variants are considered transmission bias models. With this ability, social
learners can imitate fitter variants more often, or alternatively, change their behavioural strategies
by comparing the observed behaviour of several individuals [15]. Guided variation models assume
imitators optimise behavioural traits after acquiring them [38, 1, 5], a trait which itself implies
some degree of individual learning. Spatial and population structure models add assumptions that
create constrained scenarios in which fitter individuals are copied more often than average [9, 35].
Here, we claim that none of these additions are required and that therefore the assumption that
social learners must be endowed with decision-making abilities is unnecessary.
Most existing work is based on simple analytical models where (1) the e↵ect of natural selection
is only represented by di↵erential reproduction (i.e., without considering its e↵ects on survival),
and/or (2) the strategy space is defined by a two-state environment-matching problem. When
either or both of these assumptions are made, unbiased social learners (i.e., social learners with no
decision making abilities) cannot invade a population of instinctive actuators [11, 29] and will only
partially invade a population of individual learners until a mixed equilibrium is achieved [39].
In contrast, our model shows conditions under which unbiased social learners can fix in a pop-
ulation when (1) natural selection is separated into survival and reproductive components and (2)
an extended strategy space (i.e., fitness landscape with many more than two genotypes) is explored
in parallel by both the genetic and non-genetic evolutionary systems, subject to their respective
mutation and imitation error rates. In this model, the non-genetic evolutionary system emerges
when social learners with unbiased imitation successfully invade the population.
Previous models with two-state strategy spaces have sometimes included rates of mutation and
imitation error [39, 38]. However, in a two-state model, these rates merely act as the probability of
defective transmission, whereas in our extended strategy space they a↵ect the balance of exploration
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and exploitation in the evolutionary system. Therefore, although some two-state models have
included mutation/imitation error rates, we claim they play a di↵erent role in our model.
1.3 The e↵ect of individual learners
When considering the question of how social learning evolved, most evolutionary theorists have
focused their research on finding conditions under which social learners can invade a population of
individual learners [8, 4, 39, 38, 15, 31, 1]. In these models individual learners tend to discover a
fitter-than-average behaviour for the current environmental state, but pay a fitness cost in learning
this behaviour. This cost is generally associated with the process of trial-and-error [38, 31]. In these
models the environment changes with a given frequency but individual learners always match their
behaviour to the current environmental state [8, 4, 39, 38]. In a population of individual learners,
a mutant social learner with unbiased imitation can easily increase in frequency because the social
learner is spared the trial-and-error cost of individual learning, but can acquire, through imitation,
the fit behaviour produced by it [39, 8, 4]. However, as the frequency of social learners increases
so does the chance of imitating a behaviour that does not match the current environmental state
(i.e., a population of only social learners cannot keep track of environmental changes). Therefore,
the frequency of social learners will only increase to an equilibrium point where both individual
and social learners have the same fitness value (i.e., a mixed population) [38, 39]. The fitness
of individual learners is not density dependent. Hence, at equilibrium the mixed population has
an overall fitness value equal to that of a monomorphic population of individual learners [39].
According to these models, decision-making attributes are thus required to explain the invasion of
social learners beyond this mixed equilibrium (e.g., in extremis, displacing all but one individual
learners) and an increase in the overall mean fitness of the population compared to a monomorphic
population of individual learners [38, 39, 15, 31, 1].
In this prior work, social learners can invade (but not fix) because the presence of individual
learners confers a benefit on social learners compared to instinctive actuators; social learners have
access to the fitter-than-average behaviours found by individual learners but instinctive actuators
do not. Therefore, the underlying source of fitter-than-average variants that allow social learners
to invade when individual learners are present is similar to that found in models where social
learners have decision-making abilities that improve on imitated behaviours (i.e., guided variation).
In both cases the valuable information found by social learning is ultimately derived from some
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form of individual learning (i.e., the individual ability to optimize behavioural fitness). In our
model (to be explained in the next section), social learners fix due to a purely Darwinian process
where behavioural variants (generated without bias) are the units of selection. In contrast, we can
view previous models as Lamarckian adaptation processes, necessitating mechanisms of directed
improvement acting on innate or acquired variants, in those cases via individual learning or guided
variation.
Individual learners exist in current natural populations alongside social learners, and may have
been present prior to the evolution of social learners [2]. But, as a theoretical exercise, we exclude
individual learning from the following models in order to test the hypothesis that it is not required
to explain the fixation of social learning and the emergence of a corresponding non-genetic evolu-
tionary system. Accordingly, the model presented here also enables the investigation of mechanisms
for the emergence of non-genetic/parallel evolutionary systems through the evolution of unbiased
horizontal information transfer where individual learning may not be relevant (e.g., the emergence
of an evolutionary system maintained by symbiotic bacteria which are transmitted horizontally in
a population of hosts; see Subsection 4.4 in the discussion section).
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2 The Model
Our individual-based simulation model represents each individual by two strings of bits. The first
string represents an individual’s phenotype and the second its genotype. The fitness of an individ-
ual is determined by considering only the phenotypic information. In addition, each individual has
a genetically inherited one-bit switch that determines whether it is an imitator or an instinctive
actuator. If the value of this switch is 1, the individual is a social learning imitator and, rather than
express a phenotype derived from its own genotype, it will express an “imitated” phenotype ran-
domly selected from the population. If the value of the switch is 0, the individual is an instinctive
actuator and its phenotype is simply a copy of its own genotype (for the purposes of our research
questions, a one-to-one genotype-phenotype map is su cient). For each imitator, the action of im-
itation takes place at birth and once it has happened an individual’s phenotype remains unchanged
for its lifetime.
Each agent in the initial population is an instinctive actuator with an imitation switch value
of 0 and each bit of its genotype set to 1 or 0 with equal probability. The phenotype of each
agent in the initial generation is a perfect copy of its genotype. These initial conditions prevent
mutation biases from imposing directed drift on the genotypes or phenotypes, even in the absence
of selection pressure. For all the results shown here, unless stated otherwise, the length of the
genotype and phenotype bit strings is 200 bits (L = 200), and the size of the population is 100
individuals (N = 100). Selection is defined by a Boltzmann-weighted sum of ones in the string of
phenotypic bits (L1). A string of all-1s (i.e., L1 = L) represents the optimal solution.
Qualitatively similar results can be reproduced with larger populations and longer bit strings.
Smaller populations can result in variation between simulation runs, but on average they also agree
qualitatively with the results described here. Shorter bit-strings can produce di↵erent results, as
they represent simpler search problems, and a sustained search and optimisation period of several
generations is required in order to produce the results reported here. For example, the commonly
used case of a single-bit (two-strategy) model will not reproduce our results. When only two-
strategies are explored the instinctive actuators are likely to find the fittest of the two strategies
quickly and hence prevent the key process of genotype-phenotype disengagement which we will
explain in the next section.
Selection is established by the joint action of a reproduction function and a death function,
implementing reproductive selection and survival selection, respectively. Reproduction selects an
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individual, i, from the population with a probability Pri using a Boltzmann-weighted function of
the number of 1s in the individuals phenotype (i.e., L1i) normalised across the population (Eq. 1).
Pri =
e
L1i
xrPN
k=1 e
L1k
xr
(1)
The death function selects an individual, j, from the population with a probability Pdj using a
Boltzmann-weighted function of the number of 0s in the individuals phenotype (i.e., L0j = L L1j).
Thus, Pdj is the relative probability of dying, or anti-fitness (Eq. 2).
Pdj =
e
L L1j
xdPN
k=1 e
L L1k
xd
(2)
A key feature of this model is the ability to change the relative balance between reproductive
selection and survival selection. Higher values for exponents xr and xd reduce the e↵ect of the
number of 1s in an individuals phenotype on the probabilities of reproduction and death, respec-
tively. For lower values of xr or xd, small changes in behaviour have a larger impact on reproductive
output and life expectancy, respectively.
On each iteration of the simulation, an individual is selected for reproduction by the reproduction
function and an individual is selected for death by the death function. The genotype and imitation
switch of the reproducing individual are copied and mutated, and replace the genotype and imitation
switch of the dying individual. Genotype mutations are bit-flips, and occur with probability of µg
per bit, except for the imitation switch which has a bit-flip probability of µc. If the imitation bit
of the new individual has value 0, the new phenotype bit string is a one-to-one copy of the new
genotype (not including the imitation switch). If the switch has value 1, a random phenotype from
the population is copied (unbiased horizontal imitation) with a bit-flip error rate of µp per bit. The
imitation switch can only be passed genetically and is not part of any phenotype. This separates
the genetically inherited strategy of being an imitator or not (i.e., the imitation switch) from the
string of phenotypic bits that express an individuals actual behavioural variant.
For simplicity, individuals reproduce asexually with no “crossover” during genetic replication
or phenotypic imitation and there is no environmental change altering the optimum bit-string
(L1 = L), although a brief comment on the e↵ect of the latter is presented in the discussion.
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Changing the values of µg and µp controls rates of genetic mutation and imitation error, re-
spectively. We fix µc = 0.01 for all results reported here and vary µg and µp relative to this value.
Figure 1 illustrates an algorithmic implementation of the model.
Figure 1: An algorithmic representation of the model’s logic. (1) The selection function picks an individual
from the population. (2) Its genotype string is copied including the imitation switch (mutations occur at
a rate of µg per genotype bit and µc for the imitation switch). (3a) If the imitation switch has value 1, a
random individual from the population is selected and its phenotype will be copied (imitation errors occur
at a rate of µp per bit). (3b) If the imitation switch has value 0, the phenotype will be a perfect copy of the
individual’s genotype. (4) The resulting combination of phenotype and genotype will replace an individual
selected by the death function.
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3 Results
Simulations were run for a large range of mutation rates [0.0, 0.015], imitation error rates [0.0, 0.015],
survival selection strengths [1, 20], and reproductive selection strengths [1, 20]. Each simulation
consisted of 5 ⇥ 104 iterations. The average proportion of 1s in the population’s genotypes, the
average proportion of 1s in the population’s phenotypes, and the proportion of individuals with
their imitation switch “on” (i.e., the proportion of social learners) were recorded. All simulation
runs have a population size of N = 100 and a string length for phenotype and genotype strings of
L = 200.
Where imitation error rate is larger than genetic mutation rate, µp > µg, simulations converge
to one of three distinctive patterns (Figure 2): A) Both genotypes and phenotypes converge on
the single optimum, while the proportion of imitators remains close to zero; B) Phenotypes and
genotypes initially improve together, but after around two thousand iterations, imitators rapidly
invade the population and only the phenotypes continue to improve to the optimum; C) imitators
increase in frequency slowly and inconsistently (i.e., as if the proportion of imitators in the popula-
tion was drifting), and eventually fix in the population; after fixation only the phenotypes continue
to improve. In B and C, genotypes tend to converge to the average, containing approximately equal
numbers of 1s and 0s. The de-correlation of genotype and phenotype information, accompanied by
the fixation of imitators, is here referred to as genotype-phenotype disengagement. This pattern is
considered to indicate the emergence of a non-genetic evolutionary system. The stochastic nature
of the model makes convergence probabilistic. Multiple replicates are hence required to analyse
outcomes for each parameterisation. The chances of a given run of the model converging to pattern
A, B or C is a↵ected by the strength of reproductive and survival selection (xr and xd, respec-
tively - recall that a high value indicates lower selection strength), as well as the mutation rate and
imitation error rate (µg and µp, respectively).
Scenarios in which the genetic mutation rate is larger than the imitation error rate, µg > µp,
are not considered relevant to the evolution of non-genetic evolutionary systems in this work, since
it is unrealistic that the incipient secondary system has more fidelity than the established process
of genetic replication [13, 2, 38, 31].
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Figure 2: A single representative simulation run for each of three convergence patterns, A, B and C.
Each plot depicts the change over evolutionary time in the average proportion of 1s in the population’s
phenotypes (green) and genotypes (red), and the proportion of imitators in the population (black). (A) No
disengagement: phenotype and genotype improve together and imitation frequency remains low. This case
is encountered when genetic mutation is high and the imitation error rate o↵ers not enough exploration
advantage for a given set of reproductive and survival selection strengths (Parameter set: xd = 1, xr = 10,
µg = 0.003, µp = 0.005). B) Early disengagement: the non-genetic evolutionary system emerges rapidly
in the simulation, indicated by a sharp rise in imitators and genotype-phenotype disengagement. Imitators
fix and subsequent phenotype improvement is due to non-genetic evolution. (Parameter set: xd = 1,
xr = 10, µg = 0.0005, µp = 0.005). (C) Late disengagement: non-genetic evolution takes over after several
iterations. Imitators invade slowly and with large fluctuations in frequency. This pattern occurs when
mutation and imitation error rates are very low and/or similar to one another. (Parameter set: xd = 1,
xr = 10, µg = 0.0002, µp = 0.0002).
One hundred replicates for each combination of mutation rate, µg, and imitation error rate, µp,
drawn from the set [1⇥ 10 4, 2⇥ 10 4, . . . 50⇥ 10 4], and where µp > µg, were carried out with
fixed values of survival and reproductive selection coe cients (xd = 1, xr = 10). The proportion of
13
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replicates that converge to non-genetic evolution (where the proportion of imitators is above 0.95
by the end of the run) is presented in a two-dimensional heat-map in Figure 3. This map shows all
combinations below the diagonal µp = µg, where imitation error is greater than genetic mutation.
Figure 3: Heat-map depicting how the tendency for social learners to evolve varies with the genetic mutation
rate, µg, and imitation error rate, µp. For all points in this plot µp > µg. Blue regions indicate that the
explorative advantage of imitation errors is not great enough for disengagement to occur early on during the
optimisation process. The lower region shows cases where social learners invade and fix in the population.
In all these cases the values for the selection exponents are set to xd = 1 and xr = 10 creating a selective
environment with strong survival selection and relatively weak reproductive selection. For µ values larger
than 0.005, the trends observed at the positive edge of this heat-map extrapolate within sensible limits.
The constrained range has been selected to increase resolution on contrasting regions. Black arrows indicate
points in parameter-space corresponding to the single runs shown in figure 2 (i.e., A, B and C).
Exploration of a range of survival and reproductive selection strengths is presented in the array of
heat maps in Figure 4; each having the format explained in the previous paragraph. Combinations
of selection coe cient values of 1, 5 and 10 for xd and xr were selected for their contrasting
14
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results. Figure 4 can be interpreted as a four-dimensional parameter-space representation showing
the distribution of probabilities for the fixation of social learners. For relatively strong survival
selection, and relatively high imitation error rates, social learners fix following pattern B in Figure
2. For mutation and imitation error rates that are low and similar, social learners fix following
pattern C in Figure 2. Given that our model does not feature decision-making behaviours, and
that both error rates and survival selection pressure on the trait being evolved are not functions of
previously acquired traits, we consider these results to demonstrate the evolution (and fixation) of
unbiased social learning by virtue of its adaptive value alone.
Figure 4: Array of heat maps for di↵erent combinations of reproductive and survival selection coe -
cients. Within each plot, red areas represent parameter sets for which social learners fix through genotype-
phenotype disengagement in a high proportion of simulation replicates. From left to right, columns of maps
have xr values of 1, 5 and 10. From top to bottom, rows of maps have xd values of 1, 5 and 10. Higher
values represent lower selection strength. All maps show the same range of mutation and imitation error
rates (i.e., where 0.005   µp > µg   0).
Our model highlights two important requirements for the emergence of a non-genetic evolution-
ary system from unbiased social learning. First, a strong selection pressure on survival relative
to selection pressure on reproduction, and, second, an extended strategy space combined with the
15
Gonzalez et al. • 2017
presence of mutation and imitation error rates. The culture-enhancing e↵ects of these conditions
have been discussed in existing literature [2, 38, 31]. However, their su ciency for the origin of
culture as a non-genetic evolutionary system has not been discussed.
An extensive strategy space resulting in a potential for sustained evolutionary competition
between instinctive actuators and social learners is a key feature of our agent-based approach that
is not present in classical models [15, 31, 9, 35, 39]. Understanding the e↵ect of this feature demands
analysis of individual simulation runs. In the next subsection we explain the underlying principles
that makes social learners more likely to invade a population of instinctive actuators when survival
selection is stronger than reproductive selection. The following two subsections describe two specific
mechanisms for the fixation of social learners and the emergence of a non-genetic evolutionary
system in our model; these correspond to scenarios B and C in Figure 2. Both mechanisms co-
occur in all simulations where social learners fix. However, as will be explained, the mechanism that
drives scenario B is dominant for simulations where µp   µg, and the one that drives scenario C
is dominant for simulations where µp ' µg. In the final subsection of our results, we show how the
length of the problem sequence (i.e., the length of the agents phenotype and genotype bit strings)
a↵ects the likelihood of social learning evolving in a population.
3.1 Imitation error and survival selection can compensate for lack of
reproductive selection pressure on social learners
The results shown in Figure 4 indicate that populations experiencing strong survival selection (i.e.,
xd is relatively low) and weak reproductive selection (i.e., xr is relatively high) tend to converge on
social learning for a wider range of mutation and imitation error rates (i.e., µg and µp, respectively).
In order to account for the distribution of results, we first explain here why relatively strong survival
selection benefits social learners.
First, consider that selection for reproduction alone cannot favour unbiased social learners over
instinctive actuators. In a population of instinctive actuators, selection ensures that the phenotype
expressed by a newly added o↵spring tends to be fitter than the current population mean. By
contrast, in a population of unbiased social learners the o↵spring of the fittest individuals (i.e., those
that happen to have imitated the fittest behaviours) will imitate phenotypes chosen at random from
the current population; hence the phenotypes expressed by newly added social learner o↵spring will
tend to have the same fitness as the current population average. For this reason, it is generally
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held that unbiased social learning causes a “regression to the mean” when compared to genetic
reproduction [38, 11]. However, note that instinctive actuators will also tend to su↵er from this
regression to the mean to the extent that selection for reproduction is weak, since this is the extent
to which parents will tend to be selected at random.
In contrast to selection for reproduction, selection for survival ensures that novel phenotypes
with higher fitness than the population average are maintained for longer, regardless of whether
instinctive actuators or imitators express them. By virtue of their longer than average persistence
in the population such individuals have more opportunities to reproduce, but also have more chance
of being imitated by unbiased social learners.
Instinctive actuators inherit their phenotype from their parents. Therefore, long-living instinc-
tive actuators leave more copies of their phenotype than short-living instinctive actuators. Social
learners, on the other hand, do not inherit the phenotype of their parents but imitate the phenotype
of a randomly chosen member of the population. Nevertheless, long-living agents are more likely
to be randomly selected for imitation before they are eliminated by the death function. Therefore,
social learners also leave a number of phenotypic copies proportional to their relative longevity.
In our model, selection for survival a↵ects instinctive actuators and social learners to the same
extent, while selection for reproduction a↵ects instinctive actuators exclusively.
In the absence of selection for reproduction, the only process mitigating against the regression to
the mean for social learners is selection for survival and imitation error rates. When a population’s
phenotypic quality is high, imitation errors are likely to be maladaptive, but when a population’s
phenotypic quality is low, errors are more likely to cause imitators to express phenotypes with im-
proved fitness. If the rate of imitation error is higher than that of genetic mutation, and phenotypic
quality in the population is low, then social learners will tend to discover improved phenotypes at
a higher rate than instinctive actuators.
Consequently, the invasion and fixation of social learners depends on whether or not they find
fitter solutions than instinctive actuators through imitation errors. For certain combinations of se-
lection pressure and error rate parameters, the exploration advantage of social learners (due to high
imitation error and strong selection for survival) more than compensates for the slightly stronger re-
gression to the mean that they su↵er relative to instinctive actuators (which have additional “weak”
selection for reproduction acting only on them). Under such conditions, our results show that so-
cial learners can invade populations of instinctive actuators. As we will see in the next subsection,
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this invasion must occur during the early stages of evolutionary optimisation, as higher error rates
become disadvantageous once the phenotypic quality of instinctive actuators has exceeded a certain
threshold. However, if and when an invasion of social learners occurs, it is unlikely that instinctive
actuators can ever recover.
3.2 When imitation error is much higher than genetic mutation, social
learners fix during early stages of optimisation
In order to explain how this process works, we define two periods that tend to occur during a
simulation. Figure 5 shows these periods during the first 104 iterations of a simulation run where
social learners fix as per scenario B of Figure 2.
Figure 5: The first ten thousand iterations of a single run, with two distinct periods highlighted. The
green dashed line represents the average proportion of 1s in the phenotypes, the red triangles do the same
for the genotypes and the black line represents the proportion of imitators in the population. The first
period is shaded in blue and extends from the beginning of the simulation to around iteration 3700 when
the second period begins (shaded in red). During the first period, the exploration advantage of imitators
must overcome the penalty arising from the lower heritability of their imitated behaviour or imitation will
not evolve. If imitators do not achieve a high enough frequency during the first period, genetic evolution
will have time to improve phenotypes to the extent that the high imitation error rate associated with social
learning becomes disadvantageous, halting their invasion. The hypothetical limit ↵ represents a threshold
degree of phenotypic quality, above which the high imitation error rate of social learners produces more
deleterious than beneficial errors. Consequently, if instinctive actuators achieve this threshold before social
learners achieve genotype-phenotype disengagement, the non-genetic evolutionary system will not emerge.
(Parameter Set: xd = 1, xr = 10, µg = 0.0005, µp = 0.005).
The first period runs from the start of the simulation, when the population comprises only in-
stinctive actuators that map their own genotype into their phenotype and reproduce by replicating
their genotype with a mutation rate µg. Individuals are selected to reproduce on the basis of their
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phenotype, and also selected to die on the basis of the same bit string. With a probability µc, a
new agent will mutate its inherited imitation switch from 0 to 1, and hence obtain its phenotype
by imitation with error rate µp per bit. During this period two processes occur in parallel. First,
a marginal number of imitators arise through mutation drift alone. Second, these imitators start
exploring the strategy space with error rate µp, imitating strategies from other imitators and in-
stinctive actuators alike. Under survival selection, these unbiased imitators are more likely to copy
strategies that stick around for longer than strategies that are quickly selected out by the death
function.
In the first iterations of this period, instinctive actuators are a large majority and their pheno-
types improve due to selective pressure from both reproductive and survival selection. They pass
their phenotype to their o↵spring via vertical genetic inheritance with high fidelity (µg < µp). By
contrast, imitator phenotypes improve only in response to selective pressure for survival selection.
This is because phenotypes expressed by imitators cannot increase their copy numbers by means of
reproductive selection as their o↵spring do not inherit the parental phenotype, but instead imitate
any model at random (i.e., there is no assumption of discriminatory, guided, or adaptive imitation
in this model). By contrast, survival selection still a↵ects imitators, as having a better phenotype
reduces the chance of being selected by the death function, and therefore leads to a longer life.
Longer-living agents have a higher chance of being copied by another imitator.
At this stage, imitation has an exploratory advantage, since imitation error is higher than genetic
mutation (Figure 6). But social learners can only fix if this exploratory advantage overcomes the
selection handicap that imitators su↵er from. This is more likely to occur if the trait that we are
considering has little e↵ect on fertility but a large positive e↵ect on longevity (i.e., xr   xd), as
positive e↵ects on fertility will increase the optimisation rate (through higher selective pressure)
of the genetic system (maintained by instinctive actuators) compared to the non-genetic system
(maintained by social learners).
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Figure 6: Comparison between a simulation run where social learning is evolvable (plot A), and a simulation
run where social learning is not evolvable (plot B). In plot A and B the green dotted line represents the
proportion of ones in the phenotypes of the population and the red triangles the proportion of ones in the
genotypes. The black line in plot A represents the frequency of social learners. For both runs µg = 0.0005
and for run A µp = 0.005. Selection strength coe cients are set to xr = 10 and xd = 1. Plot C shows the
variance of the sum of 1s values for the phenotypes in the populations of each run. Run A has a consistently
higher phenotypic variance than run B. This is explained by the fixation of social learners in run A, and
the consequent emergence of the non-genetic evolutionary system in which phenotypes are imitated with
an error rate higher than genetic mutation. The variance in simulation run A exhibits large spikes that
arise when the o↵spring of a social learner mutates into an instinctive actuator and expresses a phenotype
derived from its own genotype (which has not been subject to selection for as long as its ancestors have
been imitators). These mutants are selected against, causing variance to recover rapidly.
For social learning to evolve and genotype-phenotype disengagement to take place as per scenario
B in Figure 2, the imitator minority has to find better solutions at a rate that overcomes its
disadvantage from having only one source of selective pressure; survival. For all cases where µp  
µg, this needs to occur quickly. Once genetic evolution, guided by instinctive actuators, improves
20
Gonzalez et al. • 2017
the phenotype beyond a certain number of 1s (i.e., ↵ value in Figure 5), the likelihood of imitators
taking over the population drops to zero. At this point the average phenotype solution starts
benefiting from lower mutation rates due to its proximity to the optimum, and the exploration
advantage of social learners turns into a disadvantage. In Figure 3 and 4 social learners do not fix
in simulations where µg is above a certain value precisely because the population evolves phenotypes
beyond this threshold of number of 1s before social learners can rise in frequency. As a result of
this process, the area with a high proportion of simulations converging to social learners is limited
to a horizontal band at the bottom of the plot.
The second period, shaded in red in Figure 5, starts from the point at which the higher rate of
imitation error turns into a disadvantage compared to the mutation rate of genetic replication. If
fixation of imitators has already been achieved during the first period, then the genotype has been
disengaged and is no longer subject to selection. In this case, a non-genetic evolutionary system
has emerged, and only the phenotype will continue to improve with imitation error as its source
of variation and survival selection pushing it towards the optimum. This non-genetic evolutionary
system manifests as a “pool” of variants maintained by unbiased imitation alone.
An alternative way to understand this mechanism and the importance of the relative di↵erence
between imitation error rate and genetic mutation rate is by imagining two hypothetical popula-
tions under the same degree of survival selection and in the absence of reproductive selection; one
population of unbiased imitators (Pimitate) and one population of instinctive actuators (Pinherit).
When both populations are initialised with random genotypes/phenotypes (i.e., populated on
average with 50% 1s and 50% 0s), the accumulation of fit alleles in Pinherit is limited by the mutation
rate, while the accumulation of fit alleles in Pimitate is limited by the imitation error rate. If these
two rates are equal, while imitators in Pimitate can copy any strategy currently in the population,
this does not give them an advantage or disadvantage compared with Pinherit, since the strategies
available to be copied in Pimitate are no more diverse than the ones that are available to reproduce
in Pinherit.
If the imitation error rate in Pimitate were higher than the genetic mutation rate in Pinherit, then
Pimitate would initially have an advantage and would accumulate fit alleles at a higher rate than
Pinherit. If, conversely, the mutation rate in Pinherit were higher than the error rate in Pimitate (an
unrealistic assumption), then Pinherit would have an advantage and would accumulate fit alleles
faster than Pimitate.
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However, when Pimitate and Pinherit are both initialised with very fit solutions, the population
su↵ering the highest error rate would be disadvantaged since errors would tend to degrade the fit
solutions more often. At this point, if imitation error rate were lower than mutation rate it would
always pay Pinherit to swap to the higher fidelity mechanism. But for Pimitate, even if mutation
rate were much lower than imitation error rate, it would only benefit them to become instinctive
actuators if their genotypes were as fit as their phenotypes. But during the time that Pimitate
have been imitators, their genotypes have been under no selection pressure, and will therefore have
drifted towards the mean, which means that Pimitate is unlikely to give up imitation even when
its high error rate is counter-productive. This asymmetry creates a “ratchet” in the system which
ensures that even when the conditions that allowed social learners to successfully invade instinctive
actuators have changed, instinctive actuators cannot recover.
In Figure 7 we test this explanation by comparing runs that are initialised with average quality
phenotypes with runs that are initialised with higher quality phenotypes. As expected, higher
initial phenotypic quality reduces the region of the parameter space associated with convergence
to social learning, but this region is not extinguished entirely. Two areas in which social learning
still evolves can be identified: 1) where mutation rate is very low; 2) where the di↵erence between
mutation rate and imitation error rate is low.
The first case is associated with the phenotype-genotype disengagement account o↵ered above.
In extremis, when the genetic mutation rate is zero, social learning is the only source of phenotypic
variation and social learners are expected to invade even when their high imitation error rate tends
to be disadvantageous for cases where µg is very low (but not zero). If, under these conditions,
the optimal phenotype were discovered through social learning, the optimal individual would not
be selected to switch to the perfect fidelity of genetic inheritance since genotype-phenotype disen-
gagement would have ensured its genotype would be of lower quality than existing phenotypes.
However, the second case (associated with the lower left-hand corner and lower portion of the
diagonal of heat map B) is due to a second mechanism that will be discussed in the next subsection.
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Figure 7: Heat maps depicting the influence of initial phenotypic quality on the evolution of social learning.
In heat map A the initial population of instinctive actuators have average phenotypic quality (i.e., on
average 50% of phenotypic bits are in position 1). In heat map B the population is initialised with higher
quality phenotypes (i.e., on average 87.5% of phenotypic bits are in position 1). Red areas indicate a high
proportion of simulations converging to social learning (i.e., where social learners fix). Simulations with
low genetic mutation rates and relatively high imitation error rates (i.e., areas indicated by black arrows)
converge to social learning in plot A but not in plot B. In both maps the selection exponents are set to
xd = 1 and xr = 10. Increasing the initial phenotypic quality further does not qualitatively alter the results
shown here.
As further proof of our rationale and to explain the horizontal (i.e., independent of µp) transition
at µg = 0.001 in our original heat map results (see Figure 3), we present Figure 8, where our standard
simulation results in map A are compared against results for simulations where the population is
initialised with a 0.5 proportion of imitators (i.e., 50% of the initial population have their imitation
switch in position 1) and each individual phenotype is initialised with exactly half of their bits
in position 1. These modifications produce two complementary e↵ects that eliminate the relative
advantage of instinctive actuators and the genetic evolutionary system over imitators and the non-
genetic evolutionary system at the start of the simulation run according to our explanation (i.e.,
it levels the field between both evolutionary systems, at initial conditions); 1) they increase the
probability for social learners to form chains of imitation (i.e., consecutive events of imitators
imitating other imitators) from the beginning of the simulation (i.e., half of the population is
already a social learner) and 2) they decrease the probability that instinctive actuators evolve
phenotypes with sum of 1s values above the discussed ↵ threshold in the first couple of hundred
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iterations (i.e., as they would do by evolving the fittest individual phenotype from the initial high-
variance population for simulations in map A; where each phenotype bit is initialised with equal
chance of being 1 or 0).
In accordance with our explanation, large regions of the parameter space converge to social
learning in map B, including areas where µg values are above 0.001 (i.e., for simulations that do
not converge to social learning in map A). Moreover, as we use larger µp values (i.e., large imitation
error rates), social learners are able to fix in simulations with increasing values of µg (notice the
inclined boundary between red and blue regions in map B in contrast to the horizontal boundary
at µg = 0.001 in map A). Such a pattern is the result of the non-genetic evolutionary system
having an equal competitive advantage at initial conditions, and therefore imitators being more
likely to find and fix fitter behavioural variants in the early stages of optimisation. As imitation
error is set to higher values, the non-genetic evolutionary system maintained by social learners can
outcompete genetic systems with higher mutation rates (but never higher than imitation error rates)
as per scenario B in Figure 2. Once social learners fix, and the non-genetic evolutionary system
is instantiated, the process of genotype-phenotype disengagement hampers latter reinvasions by
instinctive actuators.
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Figure 8: Comparison between plot A, showing our standard simulation results where populations are
initialised with all individuals as instinctive actuators and phenotype strings bits set to 1 or 0 with equal
probability; and map B, where simulations are initialised with half the population as social learners and all
individual phenotypes with exactly half of their bits as 1s. In map B social learners fix in areas where the
imitation error rate is high, and the mutation rate is above 0.001. For increasing imitation error rate values
(µp) social learners fix for higher values of mutation rate µg in map B. Contrasting areas are indicated with
black arrows. In both maps the selection exponents are set to xd = 1 and xr = 10.
3.3 Social learners can also fix due to drift and the irreversibility of
genotype-phenotype disengagement
In our model, when social learners fix, this fixation is irreversible. Once imitators have invaded the
population and caused genotype-phenotype disengagement, genotypes cannot re-engage in genetic
evolutionary adaptation, because the information contained in these bit strings drifts at random
and is no longer subject to selective pressure (i.e., since it is not expressed in phenotypes). There-
fore, once the population starts evolving phenotypes via the non-genetic evolutionary system, it is
unlikely to go back to genetic evolution. In scenario C in Figure 2 this simple process alone (i.e.,
with no significant assistance from advantageous high error rates) can fix social learners in the long
term.
Scenario C in Figure 2 occurs under conditions where both genetic mutation (µg) and imitation
error (µp) are very low. In these simulations, tens of iterations can pass between mutation (or
imitation error) events that introduce fitter variants in the population. Consequently, not only
do social leaners have a large window of opportunity to fix (as per the mechanism explained in
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the previous subsection), but also the number of imitators can slowly increase as a result of an
asymmetry in the e↵ect of imitation switch mutations.
To understand this mechanism, we must remember that since social learner genotypes are not
expressed they are shielded from selection and therefore tend to accumulate deleterious mutations.
Consequently, the o↵spring of a long line of imitators is likely to be less fit if it mutates into an
instinctive actuator, whereas the same is not true if the o↵spring of an instinctive actuator mutates
into a social learner. Due to the asymmetry between these two mutation events, social learners can
fix without any significant explorative advantage.
In Figure 9 we prove our rationale by comparing three di↵erent heat maps for; (A) our original
simulation model, (B) simulations where phenotypes are initialised with a large proportion of 1s
(i.e., 0.875 rather than 0.5), and (C) Lamarckian simulations in which the genotype of a social
learner is updated to be a perfect copy of the phenotype that it achieved through social learning.
Comparisons between map (A) and (B) (i.e., same plots from Figure 7) serve to highlight areas
where a large proportion of simulations still converge to social learning despite phenotypes having
passed the critical threshold discussed in the previous section. The remaining red areas in plot (B)
correspond to cases where; 1) scenario C in Figure 2 occurs (µg ' µp) and 2) genetic mutation is
non-existent (µg = 0).
Forcing social learners to keep their genotype string as a copy of their phenotype prevents
genotype-phenotype disengagement in map C of Figure 9. Under such a condition social learners
do not fix for any area in the map. In these simulations genotype and phenotype e↵ectively become
a single string. Social learners are however still distinct from instinctive actuators, as the former
obtains its phenotype through horizontal transmission (i.e., non-parental imitation), whereas the
latter does it through vertical genetic inheritance.
In plot E of Figure 9, we show a single representative run where the prevention of genotype-
phenotype disengagement (i.e., by keeping phenotypes and genotypes identical within individuals)
makes the invasion of social learners reversible (compare to plot D in Figure 9). In such a situation
it is unlikely that individual simulations would converge to the fixation of social learners (i.e., would
have a final frequency of social learners that is higher than 0.95 after 5 ⇥ 104 iterations), instead
we observe a typical “drifting” pattern where social learners fluctuate in frequency throughout the
simulation run.
The results shown in map C and plot E of Figure 9 serve to illustrate our rationale with
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regards to the fixation of social learners through the slow drifting mechanism explained in this
subsection. This mechanism depends on a fundamental asymmetry between social learners and
instinctive actuators, where the former is likely to irreversibly fix in a population even when having
no significant advantage in comparison to the latter.
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Figure 9: Heat maps depicting (A) baseline results from the standard version of the model, and (B) the
influence on the evolution of social learning of increased initial phenotypic quality and (C) the e↵ect of
preventing genotype-phenotype disengagement. In heat maps A and C the initial population of instinctive
actuators have average phenotypic quality (i.e., on average 50% of phenotypic bits are in position 1). In heat
map B the population is initialised with higher quality phenotypes (i.e., on average 87.5% of phenotypic
bits are in position 1). In heat map C genotype-phenotype disengagement is prevented by setting the
genotype of a social learner to be a copy of the phenotype that it obtained through imitation. Red areas
indicate that a high proportion of simulations converge to social learning. Simulations with low genetic
mutation rates and relatively high imitation error rates (i.e., areas indicated by black arrows) converge to
social learning in plot A but not in plot B. Simulations with very low mutation rate or low mutation and
imitation error rates converge to social learning in plot B but not in plot C. Plots D and E show individual
simulation runs where µg = µp = 2 ⇥ 10 4 from maps A and C, respectively (indicated by black arrows).
The Lamarkian inheritance in C prevents genotype-phenotype disengagement, ensuring that the invasion
of imitators is reversible, preventing the fixation of social learners through the “drift + ratchet” mechanism
that is e↵ective in plots A and B (compare plots D and E). In all maps and plots the selection exponents
are set to xd = 1 and xr = 10.
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3.4 The occurrence and irreversibility of genotype-phenotype disengage-
ment depends on the dimensionality of the problem space
To the extent that the dimensionality of the problem to be solved is low (i.e., the extent to which
L, the length of phenotypes and genotypes, is small), the likelihood of the genetic evolutionary
system finding the optimal solution before social learners invade, increases. For low L, the number
of bit flip mutations required for an initial random phenotype to become the optimum sequence is
smaller, and hence the number of iterations to reach this optimum is also small. Social learners
are less likely to reach significant numbers during shorter periods of optimisation, as their high
imitation error rate (compared to genetic mutation) is only advantageous in the initial stages of
evolution, where solutions are far from the optimum.
In the previous two subsections we have stated that once genotype-phenotype disengagement
occurs a reinvasion by instinctive actuators is unlikely. In a disengaged population, genotypes
are not subject to selection and hence tend to encode phenotypes that are of lower fitness than
the population mean. However, where L is small, genotypes under no selection pressure may
occasionally come to encode relatively high fitness phenotypes simply as a result of neutral drift.
This becomes extremely unlikely as L becomes large.
When 1) the genotype of a social learner in a disengaged population encodes a phenotype that
is fitter than the populations current phenotypic mean; and 2) this genotype is expressed as a
phenotype as a result of a mutation to the imitation switch, it is possible for instinctive actuators
to reinvade a population that has undergone genotype-phenotype disengagement. Furthermore,
if the rate of genetic mutation (µg) is lower than the imitation error rate (µp), reinvasion under
these conditions is likely to occur during the late stages of optimisation (i.e., when phenotypes are
high quality); as the high fidelity of genetic transmission becomes advantageous compared to more
error-prone imitation.
In Figure 10, we present supportive results for these claims. Plot A in Figure 10 shows a standard
simulation run where irreversible genotype-phenotype disengagement occurs in a simulation where
L = 50. Plot B in Figure 10 shows a simulation run where instinctive actuators reinvade after
disengagement has occurred in a simulation where L = 6. Plot C in Figure 10 shows the tendency
for genotype-phenotype disengagement to persist (i.e., the proportion of one hundred simulation
replicates where the frequency of social learners is above 0.95 after 5⇥104 iterations) for simulations
with di↵erent values of L (black line). Also in plot C, the average proportion of 1s in the phenotypes
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and genotypes of the populations after 5⇥ 104 iterations, for 100 replicate simulations, is shown in
green and red, respectively. This plot is in agreement with our explanation and demonstrates that
for increasing values of L the likelihood of social learners to irreversibly fix also increases.
The results in Figure 10 also serve to support the claim that an extended strategy space is a
key element of our simulation model, and that results shown in this paper could not be obtained
with the classical two-state strategy space approach (i.e., where L = 1) [11, 39, 38].
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Figure 10: The e↵ect of problem length, L, on the likelihood of persistent genotype-phenotype disengage-
ment is shown using two representative simulation runs (plots A and B) and a summary of multiple runs
(plot C). Plot A shows the result of a simulation run with problem size L = 50, where irreversible genotype-
phenotype disengagement occurs during the early stages of optimisation. Plot B shows the results for a
representative simulation run in which the length of the problem size is L = 6. For this value of L genotype-
phenotype disengagement is reversible. Plot C shows the tendency for genotype-phenotype disengagement
to persist (i.e., the number of simulations where the proportion of social learners is above 0.95 after 5⇥ 104
iterations) in 100 replicate runs for each value of L between 1 and 100 (black line), and the corresponding
averaged proportion of 1s for the phenotype and genotype (i.e., the average proportion of 1s for the pheno-
type and genotype after 5⇥ 104 iterations, for 100 simulation runs, for each value of L between 1 and 100)
(green and red lines, respectively). For all simulations shown in this figure µg = 1/(100L) and µp = 1/L.
The strength of reproductive and survival selection is fixed at xd = 1 and xr = 10.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Instantiating a non-genetic evolutionary system
An evolutionary system, whether genetic or non-genetic, must instantiate the fundamental elements
of heritability, variation and selection. Here we reflect on the mechanisms that provide these
elements in the model presented here, and in prior models of non-genetic evolutionary systems. The
process of social learning implicitly introduces the first two elements when behaviour is imperfectly
transmitted from one individual to the next [38]. The balance between mutation and inheritance
is as fundamental in these systems as it is in any evolutionary process. On the one hand, too much
mutation precipitates an error catastrophe in which o↵spring are unable to improve on existing
parental variants [14, 12]. On the other, excessive fidelity retards evolution when little variation
exists for selection to act upon [12]. The consensus within the field is that social learning has a
higher error rate than genetic replication during transmission, but that this error rate is not high
enough to prevent adaptation [13, 2, 38, 31].
In most models, selection is introduced by decision-making processes such as transmission bias
and/or guided variation. Transmission bias introduces an explicit form of selection by equipping
social learners with a direct or indirect bias towards imitating variants with higher reproductive
fitness [38, 15]. Similar mechanisms include frequency dependent bias, also referred to as conformity
[16] and social status bias [38]. Once a cultural system is established, these two types of biases
can evolve without being proxies for fitness bias [38], but these biases lead to the evolution of
social learning only if they act as indirect forms of fitness biased imitation. Guided variation
introduces a hidden form of selection within every imitator. Models including guided variation
assume individuals select amongst the variants that they have copied and improve them, so that
the behaviours that they express are fitter than the ones that they imitated originally [38, 31, 1, 5].
Our results show that when survival selection is stronger than reproductive selection, the
strategy-space exploration advantage of social learners can e↵ectively o↵set the reduced selective
pressure on their emerging non-genetic system. The separation of survival and reproductive com-
ponents of selection is a key feature of this work and contrasts with the classical assumption that
survivability is merely a proxy for reproductive fitness. This feature has been included in previous
analytical work by McElreath and Strimling [29] where an extension of Rogers’ basic model eval-
uates conditions under which vertical imitation is favoured over horizontal imitation. The authors
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show that vertical imitation (i.e., imitating ones own parents) is favoured over horizontal imitation
(i.e., imitating non-parental agents) when reproductive selection is stronger than survival selection
[29]. However, social learners in McElreath and Strimling’s model (i.e., both vertical and horizontal
imitators) rely on the presence of individual learners in order to invade; as they do in the original
Rogers model (i.e., by imitating fit behaviours from individual learners without themselves having
to pay the trial-and-error cost of learning) [39]. In both models, therefore, social learners are only
able to invade until they reach an equilibrium frequency in a mixed population [29, 39]. The models
proposed by McElreath and Strimling, and Rogers, do not include an extended strategy space nor
genetic mutation or imitation error rates [29, 39]. Only when (1) we di↵erentiate between repro-
ductive and survival selection types and (2) we consider these rates in an extended strategy space
(i.e., not a simple two-strategy model), can unbiased social learners irreversibly fix in a population
of instinctive actuators.
4.2 Limitations
Our model is an extreme simplification of a natural process. It o↵ers, however, a theoretical insight
into minimal conditions for the fixation of social learners, conditions that can be considered su cient
for a basic non-genetic evolutionary system to emerge [27, 26, 2]. Our results suggest that any pop-
ulation encountering a new environmental challenge can fix social learners provided that potential
solutions in the strategy space enhance survivability more than fertility, and that variation intro-
duced during social transmission is higher than that of genetic inheritance, consequently, a↵ording
social learners an exploration advantage. In our results, disengagement should not be interpreted
as the complete substitution of entire genomes by non-genetic information. After all, social learning
cannot evolve without a biological substrate. We rather consider the genotypes and phenotypes
in our model to represent solutions to specific challenges that can either be solved behaviourally
through imitated traits or by genetically encoded traits. In our model, once genotype-phenotype
disengagement has occurred, behavioural variants are una↵ected by the genetic evolutionary sys-
tem. This is, of course, a simplification. In natural populations the indirect e↵ect of countless other
genes (i.e., genes not directly expressing behaviours for a particular challenge) can have an e↵ect
on the evolution of behavioural variants [38, 31].
In nature, the map between genetic information and the expressed phenotype is incredibly com-
plex [33]. We are yet to untangle the intricate relations between genes and their developmental
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environment, and the potential exploration capabilities of gene networks (i.e., their ability to ex-
plore and a↵ect the fitness landscape), which might be greater than current theory has accounted
for [42]. Nevertheless, we assume complex behaviours are harder to find genetically than by so-
cial learning. The argument is that solutions might be out of reach for genomes due to further
developmental constraints and contingencies. While our model does not account for any of these
complexities explicitly, it assumes that they would add more constraints on strategy-space explo-
ration for instinctive actuators than for social learners, and therefore including them would more
likely increase rather than decrease the chances of social learning evolving.
Our simulation model shows that a high imitation error rate can be detrimental to the evolution
of social learners when behaviours are close to the optimum. Some analytical models explicitly
include a fixed fitness cost for social learners as a way to represent this imitation error rate (i.e.,
the “cost” of social learning) [31]. Here, we show this high error rate can be both an enabler and
an inhibitor of the fixation of social learners, depending on the optimisation problem and the value
of the imitation error rate compared to genetic mutation. In our model no further costs associated
with social learning are introduced. All costs related to the development and maintenance of the
physiological hardware that allows imitation are considered negligible compared to the fitness value
produced by the imitated behaviour itself. All agents compete for the same pool of resources
and confront the same challenges when doing so. When population structure, multiple pools of
resources, and optimal foraging theory are considered the fixation of unbiased social learners might
not happen in the way described here.
In all our simulations the value of µc has been set to 0.01. This means, on average, once in
one hundred iterations an instinctive actuator turns into an imitator or vice versa. The argument
for fixing this rate independent from µg is one of simplicity, not artefact. Analyses of our model
show that a critical density of imitators is required to start chains of imitation (imitators copying
imitators), as sequential events of high-error transmission are required to start a non-genetic evo-
lutionary system that is competitive compared to the genetic one. The lower the chance of these
chains forming, the less likely it is for social learners to fix, even under otherwise favourable condi-
tions. Fixing the mutation rate for the imitation switch ensures a constant “background” density
of imitators is created by mutation alone, independent of the fidelity of both genetic and social
transmission, and that this density is resistant to stochastic fluctuations throughout the simula-
tion. This simplification does not decrease the validity of our analyses, as the critical initial density
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of imitators is still marginally small. It is also not the only way of increasing the tendency for
imitative chains to form. We hypothesise the same e↵ect can be achieved with µc = µg by imposing
a simple spatial population structure and restraining imitation to only take place locally.
4.3 Increasing the long-term overall mean fitness of the population
Our model explores minimal conditions for the evolution of unbiased social learning using an ex-
tended strategy space defined by the “onemax” problem on a string of length L. For all param-
eterisations where social learners fix, the process of genotype-phenotype disengagement prevents
instinctive actuators from re-invading the population, therefore maintaining the long-term stability
of the non-genetic evolutionary system over its genetic counterpart. However, the genetic system
on its own (i.e., a population with no social learners) can also find the optimal solution in this space
eventually. It is not an explicit claim of our model that unbiased social learning can increase the
long-term overall mean fitness of the population compared to a population of instinctive actuators.
Instead, we merely show that by increasing the overall mean fitness only during the early stages of
optimisation (i.e., blue region in Figure 5) social learners can irreversibly fix.
In theory processes like the Baldwin E↵ect where individuals gradually canalise learned be-
haviours into instincts [40] could cause the reinvasion of instinctive actuators and the displacement
of social learners in the long term. However, this process is unlikely to occur in our model as
the rate of optimisation of the non-genetic evolutionary system (i.e., the system driven by social
learners) keeps socially learned behaviours far fitter than any instinctive behaviour. After disen-
gagement, the large fitness di↵erence between socially learned behaviours and instincts creates a
scenario where no genetic lineage of instinctive actuators could be maintained for long enough to
reinvade. Genotypes in the population of social learners accumulate a large number of random
mutations. Therefore, whenever one of these agents’ o↵spring mutates into an instinctive actuator,
their expressed behaviour is sure to be outcompeted by the behaviours of social learners. The
relatively high rate at which genotypes accumulate mutations, compared to the rate at which they
are exposed to any selective pressure, e↵ectively makes it impossible for instinctive actuators to
reinvade after genotype-phenotype disengagement has occurred.
Significant e↵ort in evolutionary theory has been focused on explaining the long term advantage
of social learning (i.e., how social learners can increase the overall mean fitness of a population)
[39, 38]. As we mentioned, our model does not explicitly show that the fixation of unbiased social
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learners increases the overall mean fitness of a population. However, in the following paragraphs we
suggest two ways in which this could be achieved; (1) considering strategy spaces more complicated
than the “onemax” problem and (2) including a rate of environmental change.
With the intention of keeping our fitness function as simple as possible, we have focused on
the “onemax” problem in this paper. However, fitness functions can be far more complicated than
this [12]. In particular there can be functions where no monotonically increasing paths between
local and global optima exists [12, 23]. In these cases populations can get stuck at local optima;
unable to “jump” the gap formed by intervening sequences with lower-than-average fitness (e.g., by
mutation) and reach a gradient leading to sequences with higher fitness values.
Previous authors have suggested imitation can aggravate this situation by reducing the overall
variation in the population [28], a claim that is only true if social learners are assumed to imitate
with perfect fidelity. In our model we explicitly include an imitation error rate that is greater than
the genetic mutation rate [38]. Therefore, the non-genetic system maintained by unbiased social
learning would have a greater chance of crossing low-fitness gaps between optima in a “rugged”
landscape [12, 43]. This ability would tend to increase the long-term mean fitness of a population
of social learners compared to a population of instinctive actuators, as the former could reach
optima inaccessible to the latter.
Another scenario in which unbiased social learners can increase the overall mean fitness of
a population (i.e., compared to a monomorphic population of instinctive actuators) exists when a
moderate rate of environmental change is included. Our fitness function considers a string of all-ones
as an optimal sequence (i.e., phenotypic fitness varies inversely with the hamming distance between
a phenotype and the string of all-ones). An equivalent function can be produced if we consider
fitness to vary inversely with the hamming distance to some arbitrary bit string and consider this
string to be the optimal solution. Given this equivalence, periodically altering the optimal solution
throughout the optimisation process and recalculating the corresponding fitness values after each
change can represent a rate of environmental change (without this change implying a new type of
problem being “solved”).
Under a moderate rate of environmental change we hypothesise that neither of the evolutionary
systems (i.e., genetic and non-genetic) would be able to drive the average phenotype of the popula-
tion to the optimum as the rate of environmental change would constantly move this target. If the
rate of environmental change keeps the average phenotype value within the blue region of Figure
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5 (i.e., the region where social learners find solutions faster than instinctive actuators) unbiased
social learners (with their higher imitation error rate) could increase the overall mean fitness of
the population. Therefore, under this scenario, the evolution and fixation of social learners would
improve adaptiveness at a population level when compared to a monomorphic population of instinc-
tive actuators subjected to the same rate of environmental change. The idea that moderate rates of
environmental change can favour the evolution of social learning is in agreement with conclusions
derived form existing models [22, 41, 34, 10, 7].
4.4 Our work as a general model for the evolution of horizontal infor-
mation transfer
Our conclusions not only have implications for the specific case of horizontal imitation, but also
for the evolution of horizontal information transfer in general. For example, a mechanistically
analogous scenario to the one described in this paper could occur in a population of hosts and
symbionts. In this analogous scenario, the spread of symbiotic bacteria from one host to another
would be equivalent to the spread of variants in social learning systems. We could imagine members
of the host population having a “switch” with two states; one in which they obtain a useful enzyme
by inheriting an enzyme-producing bacterial strain with a low mutation rate from their parents,
and another in which they rely on the horizontal acquisition of this bacterial symbiont in order to
produce the enzyme for them. This acquisition process could take many forms, from generic close-
range interactions to specific types of transmission, such as sharing food or ingesting faecal matter.
If horizontally transmitted bacteria are subject to higher mutation rates and shorter replication
times compared to the parentally inherited bacterial strains (e.g., by virtue of the stress of being
outside the host), this would ensure an exploratory advantage for horizontal transmission analogous
to the relatively high error rate associated with imitation in social learners.
In this scenario our model predicts that horizontal contagion by symbiotic bacteria, and the
associated behaviour that enhances the chances of contagion, can evolve in the host population
if the enzyme extends the lifespan of the hosts (hence the chances of infecting others) more than
it increases their reproductive output (i.e., survival selection greater than reproductive selection).
The evolution of horizontal contagion also depends on the relative mutation rates of horizontally
infecting strains and vertically inherited ones, with the former needing to be large enough such that
the exploration advantage of horizontal transmission is able to displace vertical transmission during
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early stages of the optimisation process (i.e., during the “first period” described in Figure 5).
5 Conclusion
Our model demonstrates that a basic non-genetic system can emerge in a population when selection
pressure for survivability is stronger than selection pressure for reproduction. An extended strategy
space (where exploration over a large sequence-space is required) distinguishes our approach from
previous models and is essential for understanding the exploration advantage of social learning ver-
sus genetic inheritance. Analysis of our results leads to a consistent explanation for the emergence of
a non-genetic evolutionary system where phenotype and genotype disengage, with the former evolv-
ing exclusively by social learning that is unbiased (i.e., non-critical/non-discriminatory/unguided).
During this process of disengagement the imitator minority must be able to o↵set its lower selec-
tion pressure with its higher error rate, a condition that is facilitated when the contribution of
the evolved trait to survivability is more important than its contribution to reproductive fecundity.
Our simulation model o↵ers a very simple framework for the emergence of non-genetic systems and
serves as a tool for future research extensions. This simplicity, in particular removing the need
for decision-making abilities such as those that result in transmission bias and/or guided variation,
lowers the minimal number of traits that a species must have in order to evolve social learning and
therefore broadens its potential application.
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